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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE JOY OF TEACHING ADMIRALTY
STEVEN F. FRIEDELL*
INTRODUCTION
The admiralty course poses several challenges for a professor that can be
turned to one’s advantage. It is a survey course that includes issues of
jurisdiction, procedure, and a host of areas of substantive law that are related
only in that they relate to vessels. No one can hope to be an expert on all of
these matters. However, one can use the variety of subjects to one’s advantage
by focusing on one topic at a time, and sometimes the insights one gains from
one topic carry over to another. One can approach any topic in the course in a
variety of ways—such as a matter of legal history, comparative law, law and
economics, or a practical guide for those about to enter the bar. As my
interests have shifted, I have emphasized different subject areas and have
varied my approach.
I. THE PERIL OF LEGAL IMAGINATION—THE “ADMIRALTY SIDE”
Although the course in admiralty has undoubted value for the student
hoping to enter the practice of maritime law, it also provides the generalist
with a valuable insight into some of the intrinsic problems of the legal process.
One such problem is the potential misuse of legal concepts. One such concept
that many lawyers acquire while they are students is there is that an “admiralty
court” or at least an “admiralty side” to the federal district court. It might seem
that just as there are specialists in areas like tax and bankruptcy, and there are
tax courts and bankruptcy courts, there must also be an admiralty court for
those who specialize in admiralty. As shorthand for saying that a federal
district court has admiralty jurisdiction over a claim, the terms “admiralty
court” or “admiralty side” are welcome tools. The terms can get us into
trouble, however, if we forget that that is all they mean. Once we begin to
think that we are talking about a real “Court of Admiralty” like the old English
High Court of Admiralty, or a court of limited jurisdiction like the Tax Court
or Bankruptcy Court, we run the risk of creating all sorts of mischief.
For example, there are those who think that if a plaintiff designates a claim
as a maritime claim, then the claim is somehow within the admiralty court; and
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therefore, all other claims in the case, whether brought by the plaintiff, the
defendant, or other parties, must also be tried in that court.1 The result is that a
jury can try none of these claims in the absence of a statute to the contrary.2
Similarly, the predominant view is there can be no removal of a state case “to
admiralty” and that an admiralty claim filed in state court can only be removed
to the “law side” of the federal court, that is, a federal court having diversity or
federal question jurisdiction.3
These problems begin to disappear once one realizes that there is no such
thing as an “admiralty court” or “admiralty side.”4 The only questions are ones
of jurisdiction and procedure, which are solved by looking to the Constitution,
statutes, and the Federal Rules of Procedure. So, for example, Rule 9(h) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows each party filing a “claim for relief”
that is within the federal court’s admiralty jurisdiction and also within that
court’s “subject-matter jurisdiction on some other ground,” to determine
whether that claim will be designated as a maritime claim for certain
procedural purposes.5 That is all Rule 9(h) allows.6 Because it pertains to
each claim, not to the entire case, the plaintiff may designate some—but not
all—claims as maritime, and the defendant and other parties possess the same
right as to any claims that they bring.7
Similarly, the removal issue is not dependent on whether the defendant
seeks to remove it to an “admiralty court.” The issue ought to be decided by
applying the removal statute,8 which allows defendants to remove non-federal
question cases if none of the defendants were sued in their home state.9
Normally, this will mean that there is diversity jurisdiction, but not always, as

1. E.g., Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968, 987–88 (5th Cir.
1978). The Fifth Circuit has recently modified its approach, holding that a longshore worker who
had joined an in personom claim against a vessel owner with an in rem claim against the vessel
could have both claims tried to by jury as long as the plaintiff alleged only diversity jurisdiction
over the in personom defendant. Luera v. M.V. Alberta, 635 F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 2011).
2. Id. at 986.
3. DAVID W. ROBERTSON, STEVEN F. FRIEDELL & MICHAEL F. STURLEY, ADMIRALTY
AND MARITIME LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 111–12 (2d ed. 2008).
4. See Brainerd Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 11 (1959).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h).
6. Id.
7. Steven F. Friedell, When Worlds Collide: The In Rem Jury and other Marvels of Modern
Admiralty, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 143, 148 (2004); 1 STEVEN F. FRIEDELL, BENEDICT ON
ADMIRALTY § 133 (7th ed. rev. 2009).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006).
9. The key provision is the second sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). See Steven F. Friedell,
The Disappearing Act: Removal Jurisdiction of an Admiralty Claim, 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 75, 78
(2006) (describing when claims can properly be removed).
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when the amount in controversy is too low or when a plaintiff and a defendant
are foreigners or from the same state.
The idea that there is something real about an “admiralty court” led the
Supreme Court to effectively re-write the Jones Act, passed by Congress in
1920,10 to save it from what the Court mistakenly thought was a “grave
[constitutional] question” of allowing seamen to “withdraw . . . [their actions]
from the reach of the maritime law and the admiralty jurisdiction.”11 Prior to
1920, a seaman who had a simple claim for negligence against his employer
was denied recovery.12 However, seamen could recover for damages caused
by unseaworthiness and were entitled to maintenance and cure.13 In pertinent
part the Jones Act provided:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statues of the United States modifying or
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to
14
railway employees shall apply . . . .

From the text of the Jones Act, it is apparent that Congress intended to provide
seamen with an election of remedies: Either they could sue under the old
system for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure, or they could sue for
compensation for personal injuries caused by negligence.15 Congress thought
if a seaman sought the latter option he must do so “at law.”16 Since federal
courts in 1920 had separate rules of procedure for law claims, equitable claims,
and maritime claims, the intended effect was that federal courts would apply
the legal rules of civil procedure to the newly-created negligence claim.
However, in a landmark decision, Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, the
Supreme Court was led astray by its belief in the “admiralty side” of the
court.17 It thought that it would be improper for Congress to exclude a class of
maritime actions from the “admiralty side.”18 To avoid that result, the Court
interpreted the Jones Act to allow a seaman the option of bringing the new
negligence claim on either the “law” or the “admiralty” side.19

10. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988 (1920) (originally codified in
pertinent part at 46 U.S.C. § 688).
11. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390, 387 (1924).
12. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
13. Id.
14. 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1926). The text of the statute passed in 1920 was substantially
unchanged until 2006. The current version of the statute is at 46 U.S.C. § 30104(a) (2006).
15. 46 U.S.C. § 688(a).
16. Id.
17. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 391 (1924).
18. Id. at 378.
19. Id. at 391.
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The Court’s re-writing provided a minor benefit to seamen. Under the
plain terms of the statute, seamen would have no right to preclude defendants
from demanding jury trials in federal court for the new negligence cause of
action.20 Under Panama Railroad, seamen can do just that by bringing their
claims on the “admiralty side,”21 or in modern parlance, by designating their
claim as a Rule 9(h) claim.22 Most personal injury plaintiffs are unlikely to
pursue that option, as they will likely prefer a jury trial.
As Panama Railroad shows, one of the effects of imagining the existence
of “admiralty courts” or federal courts as having an “admiralty side,” is that
one is likely to confuse issues of subject matter jurisdiction with issues of
substantive law and procedure. A Jones Act claim is within the federal court’s
admiralty jurisdiction by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) and within its federal
question jurisdiction by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.23 It might also be within
the court’s diversity jurisdiction. There are not three separate courts or three
separate “sides.” There is only one federal district court, and how it comes to
possess jurisdiction does not determine the choice of law or the procedure to be
followed. Those issues are determined by statute, case law, and rules of
procedure. The “grave question” that the Court avoided by its interpretation
was a question of its own imagining.24 Congress was not depriving the federal
courts of their admiralty jurisdiction. Nor was it withdrawing any claim from
the “maritime law or admiralty jurisdiction.”25 Instead, it was allowing seamen
a claim for simple negligence against their employers and mandating that such
claims, which are within the federal court’s admiralty jurisdiction, be tried
according to the legal rules of procedure and tried by juries.26
II. THE INTERSECTION OF STATUTES AND JUDGE-MADE LAW
A.

Wrongful Death Cases

Another theme I enjoy exploring with my admiralty classes is the
intersection of statutes and judge-made law. Federal courts have at times felt
free to fashion admiralty law and have not been afraid to depart from the
patterns established in the non-maritime sphere. At other times the federal
courts have been reluctant to do so. Wrongful death cases provide a good
example. In a circuit court case from 1865, Justice Chase penned the famous

20. See 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (expressly providing for the “right to trial by jury” without
reference to party).
21. Panama R.R., 264 U.S. at 391.
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006).
24. Panama R.R., 264 U.S. at 390.
25. Id. at 386.
26. 46 U.S.C § 688(a) (1926).
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words, “[C]ertainly it better becomes the humane and liberal character of
proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not
required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules,”27 in holding that
there was a maritime wrongful death remedy. Some years later, the Supreme
Court came to the opposite conclusion in The Harrisburg, holding that in the
absence of statute, no wrongful death remedy existed in admiralty.28 It was not
until 1970 that the Supreme Court overruled The Harrisburg in Moragne v.
States Marine Lines.29 Its holding was broad: “[A]n action does lie under
general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties.”30 Four
years later, in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, the Supreme Court held that
the remedy included a right to compensation for loss of society.31 Today,
however, due to a series of limiting decisions by the Supreme Court, little of
Moragne and Gaudet remain. The new remedy does not apply to deaths on the
high seas,32 and states are not allowed to supplement the recovery under the
Death on the High Seas Act to include recovery for loss of society.33 In Miles
v. Apex Marine Corp., the Court held that a seamen’s estate suing for
unseaworthiness is limited to the same measure of damages as is available
under the Jones Act, which means no recovery for loss of society and no
recovery of lost future earnings.34
Moragne and Miles present two different approaches to the use of statutes.
The Moragne Court looked at statutes as creating “policy . . . beyond the
particular scope of each of the statutes involved.”35 It also thought that a
variety of statutes, both state and federal, could provide “persuasive analogy”
on particular issues.36 One of the issues in Moragne was whether recovery for
wrongful death was against public policy. The Court also thought that state
and federal statutes could provide guidance on the questions of determining the
beneficiaries and the measure of damages.37 By contrast, Miles looked to
statutes for providing specific answers to matters of detail, and once Congress
provided an answer to a particular issue, the courts would not be free to depart

27. The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (No. 12,578).
28. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213 (1886).
29. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 378 (1970).
30. Id. at 409.
31. 414 U.S. 573, 584 (1974).
32. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624 (1978) (ruling that the Death
on the High Seas Act (DOSHA) governs wrongful-death claims for deaths on the high seas).
33. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 232 (1986).
34. 498 U.S. 19, 37 (1990).
35. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 390 (1970). See Robert F. Williams,
Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-Law Cases, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
554, 561–63 (1982) (discussing influence of Moragne on non-maritime cases).
36. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 408.
37. Id.
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from it in analogous situations not governed by the statute.38 Because there
was no statute concerning loss of society for claims based on unseaworthiness,
the Court needed to look elsewhere. The closest analogy, it thought, was the
Jones Act, which governs claims for negligence.39 However, the Jones Act is
itself silent on the issue, merely incorporating the provisions of the Federal
Employees Liability Act (FELA). FELA is also silent, except that in 1913 the
Supreme Court ruled that FELA does not allow recovery for loss of society.40
The Miles Court reasoned that the Jones Act must have incorporated FELA’s
limitation it created in 1913, stating, “[w]e assume that Congress is aware of
existing law when it passes legislation.”41 Miles, therefore, did not really apply
the Jones Act by analogy; it applied by analogy a 1913 decision that was out of
step with decades of decisions that had broadened seamen’s remedies for
injury and death.
It is too simple to assume that Congress must have intended to freeze
seamen’s remedies to those that existed in 1913 or 1920. The Jones Act and
FELA are remedial pieces of legislation, and as the Court has recognized, the
recovery under each is not limited to those that Congress specified in those
statutes or would necessarily have articulated at the time the statutes were
adopted.42 Further, the Court has chosen to develop the negligence remedy for
seamen and railway workers along common law principles and has at times
gone beyond well-established common law doctrine.43
One might assert that the Miles Court imagined itself as having a modest
role, subordinate to the will of Congress. If so, it is a false modesty, for Miles
extended the Court’s 1913 interpretation of the FELA to a claim for
unseaworthiness governed by neither FELA nor the Jones Act. The use of the
Jones Act in this way is ironic. The statute, meant to broaden the remedies
available to injured seamen, is being used to constrain them in an area not
governed by the statute. A striking contrast is the development of the
unseaworthiness remedy itself. It was adopted by the district courts in the late

38. See Miles, 498 U.S at 32–33, 36 (indicating that there is no recovery under the general
maritime law for loss of society or lost future earnings).
39. Id. at 36.
40. Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 74 (1913).
41. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32.
42. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 541–54 (1994) (recognizing claim
under FELA for negligent infliction of emotional distress if within the zone of danger even
though FELA is silent on the issue; the Court looks to the purposes and background of FELA and
to the common law in determining the scope of the statute).
43. E.g., Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 438–39 (1958) (employer was
negligent per se for violating a statute even though the statute was not intended to protect the
worker from the type of injury that occurred).
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half of the nineteenth century, using an English statute as a model.44
Originally it required a showing of negligence on the part of the shipowner, but
in the course of the twentieth century the Supreme Court developed it into a
strict liability regime.45 The English statute was suggestive, providing
“persuasive analogy,”46 and the Jones Act’s requirement of negligence did not
prevent the Court from developing a parallel recovery system that does not
require proof of fault.47
B.

Life Salvage

The admiralty course provides other examples of courts using statutes to
limit recovery even though the legislative intent was the opposite. One such
area involves saving life at sea. The life-salvage provision of the 1912 Salvage
Act48 was intended to implement part of a 1910 treaty49 that was meant to
provide life salvors with additional rights. Prior to that time, American and
English courts gave additional rewards to property salvors if they also saved
life.50 If one salvor saved a life and another saved property, an English statute
allowed the life salvor a claim against the property saved.51 One American
case, decided by an authority on salvage law, reached the same result.52
English law also allowed life salvors to claim an award from a government
fund if no property was saved.53 The 1910 treaty was a compromise between
the English view and that of continental countries which did not recognize life
salvage.54 Article 8 of the treaty provided that the amount awarded for
44. Merchant Shipping Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., c. 80, § 5 (Eng.); See The Osceola, 189
U.S. 158, 171 (1903).
45. See generally Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
46. See case cited supra note 36 and accompanying text.
47. Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 546–50.
48. Salvage Act, Pub. L. No. 249, 37 Stat. 242, 242 (1912) (codified as amended 46 U.S.C. §
80107 (2006)).
49. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Assistance and
Salvage at Sea, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658, reprinted in 6 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY §§ 4-1, 44 (Frank L. Wiswall, Jr. ed., 2010) [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
50. E.g., The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611 (C.C.D. Me. 1840) (No. 4434); Taylor v. Twenty-Five
Thousand Dollars, 23 F. Cas. 806 (C.C.D.S.C. 1801) (No. 13,807); The Aid, (1822) 166 Eng.
Rep. 30 (Admlty); 1 Hagg. 82.
51. Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 104 § 8 (Eng.).
52. The Mulhouse, 17 F. Cas. 962 (C.C.S.D. Fla. 1859) (No. 9910). For a fuller and more
accurate report of the case see Rigby v. The Cargo and Materials from the Wrecked Ship
Mulhouse (1859), a copy of which is contained in 1 Pamphlets Collected by Elbridge T. Gerry
681, at the United States Supreme Court library. Judge Marvin, author of The Mulhouse, wrote a
treatise on salvage law. WILLIAM MARVIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WRECK AND SALVAGE
(1858).
53. Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 104 § 8.
54. Steven F. Friedell, Compensation and Reward for Saving Life at Sea, 77 MICH. L. REV.
1218, 1242 n.89 (1979).
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property salvage should be enhanced when life was also saved;55 Article 9
provided that life salvors were to obtain a portion of the award made to
property.56 Because American case law already reflected the requirement of
Article 8, the 1912 statute only put Article 9 into effect.57 Moreover, the 1910
treaty was intended to allow countries to provide “greater or more specific
rights” than those provided in the treaty.58 Following its adoption of the treaty,
England continued its more generous scheme.59
Some American courts have unfortunately taken a different approach.
They have read the 1912 statute as providing the only means of obtaining a
life-salvage award.60 Some have read restrictions into the statute that were
never intended, such as requiring that life salvors must forego the opportunity
to save property if they are to obtain the benefit of the statute.61 The essential
unfairness of the rule has prompted other courts to allow recovery of a life
salvor’s expenses under a theory of unjust enrichment.62
It ought to be hoped that a salvage treaty signed in 198963 would put at
least some of the concerns about the restrictive reading of the 1912 statute to
rest.64 The treaty makes it clear that the efforts at life saving are to be taken
into account in fashioning a salvage award.65 Unfortunately, American courts
have largely ignored the treaty, regarding it as little more than a restatement of
existing law.66
Before leaving the subject of salvage, it should be observed that the law
and economics school of legal analysis provides a useful explanation of the
property salvage rules—the law seeks to put the parties in the same position
that they would have been had they been able to negotiate a contract in a
competitive market at the moment of peril.67 The life-salvage rules, however,

55.
56.
57.
58.

Brussels Convention, supra note 49, § 4-3.
Id. § 4-4.
46 U.S.C. § 80107 (2006).
Friedell, supra note 54, at 1244 n.91 (quoting PROCÈS-VERBAUX DU CONFÉRENCE
MARITIME 102 (1910)).
59. Id. at 1245 n.92.
60. Markakis v. S.S. Volendam, 486 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
61. The Eastland, 262 F. 535, 540 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1919) (No. 32,231).
62. E.g., Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 553
F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977).
63. International Convention on Salvage, Apr. 28, 1989, 1953 U.N.T.S. 193, reprinted in
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 49, at §§ 4-2A, 4-13.
64. Martin Davies, Whatever Happened to the Salvage Convention 1989?, 39 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 463, 497–98 (2008).
65. International Convention on Salvage, supra note 63, § 4-18.
66. Davies, supra note 64, at 463.
67. See Margate Shipping Co. v. M.V. JA Orgeron, 143 F.3d 976, 986 (5th Cir. 1998) (“In
an ideal world, every meeting of salvor and salvee would result in a freely negotiated contract for
salvage services priced at a competitive level.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
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are not so easily explainable. One argument for denying any reward to life
salvors is that most would-be rescuers are sufficiently motivated by altruism to
rescue lives in peril.68 However, altruism is too often insufficient to induce
even some rescues that might be undertaken at little cost,69 and in any event,
the patchwork pattern of the law cannot be satisfactorily explained in economic
terms. For example, it has been suggested that it may be necessary to reward
life salvage only when both life and property are saved because it may be only
there that the opportunity costs to the life salvor are too high.70 However,
many life salvors have even more substantial opportunity costs than the loss of
a handsome property-salvage award—the cost of not remaining safely on
board or “snugly on shore.”71
C. Deviation
Some admiralty decisions display an unwillingness to enforce a statute
when it changes accepted judicial practice.72 A good example is the deviation
doctrine that has been used to thwart the desire of Congress to limit a
Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and
Altruism, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 83 (1978) (exploring generally the economics of rescue situations). But
see M.B.W. Sinclair, The Cherry Valley Case: How Wrong Can Economists Be About Salvage?,
31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 57 (2006) (arguing that Landes and Posner’s theory “fails to consider the
culture and motivation of those whose behavior it purports to explain”).
68. See Landes & Posner, supra note 67, at 104.
69. In The Emblem, Judge Ware had this to say:
[I]n the present case, there are some circumstances which, I am free to say, have struck
my mind with considerable surprise. They are, that this vessel should have lain, for four
days, in one of the most frequented parts of the American seas, with vessels continually
passing her, some of them almost within hailing distance, and when they were in full view
of this unhappy company, who were lying thus lashed and dying upon the wreck, and no
one came to their relief until more than half of their number were released from their
sufferings, by death, and consigned to a watery grave. It is a fact, which would seem to
be incredible, if it did not rest upon indubitable and unsuspected proof. If this fact is to be
taken as a just measure of the humanity of the persons who frequent those seas, I know
not but it may be the part, not only of humanity, but of worldly wisdom, to let them
understand that sometimes even in godliness there is gain, and to tempt them by the
allurements of pecuniary profit, if they can be led by no other, to acts of humanity and
mercy.
The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611, 612–13 (C.C.D. Me. 1840) (No. 4434).
70. Landes & Posner, supra note 67, at 104–05. Even if true, the rationale would suggest
that pure life salvors receive an award if they gave up an opportunity to save property. Countries
with more generous life-salvage rules do not seem to incur greater inefficiencies as a result.
71. Taylor v. Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars, 23 F. Cas. 806, 807 (C.C.D.S.C. 1801) (No.
13,807).
72. See J. Hoke Peacock III, Note, Deviation and the Package Limitation in the Hague Rules
and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: An Alternative Approach to the Interpretation of
International Uniform Acts, 68 TEX. L. REV. 977, 979–80 (1990) (noting a circuit split in
treatment of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act as a deviation from the common law).
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shipowner’s liability for cargo loss.73 Prior to the adoption of Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) in 1936, American courts applied the doctrine,
not only in cases of geographical deviations,74 but in cases of other types of
breaches, to deprive the carrier of its defenses.75 Some courts went further and
held that a deviating carrier lost its right to invoke the bill of lading’s package
limitation.76 A few judges disagreed with this latter point, saying that although
the deviation rendered the carrier an insurer, it was an insurer of cargo that the
parties agreed was worth a certain amount.77 Although the records of the
Hague Convention and COGSA’s legislative history reflected this latter
view,78 most American courts have deprived carriers of the right to limit
liability when a deviation occurs.79 However, the courts have shown a
reluctance to extend the doctrine. As one court noted when refusing to extend
the doctrine to a case of gross negligence in furnishing an unseaworthy vessel:
[E]ven the holding that a deviation in the geographical sense voids limitations
on the carrier’s liability seems inconsistent with the language of COGSA. . . .
Up to this point the concept of “quasi deviation” in the United States has
recognized only one instance, deck stowage of cargo which the carrier had
agreed to carry below deck, for which the carrier becomes liable in full as an
insurer of the shipper’s cargo. Whatever may be thought of that principle, it is
80
easy to administer and carriers know the risks.

73. Id.
74. The Willdomino, 272 U.S. 718, 725 (1927); The Indrapura, 171 F. 929 (C.C.D. Or.
1909) (No. 4757) (holding that the geographical deviations would not limit the ship owners’
liability).
75. E.g., Sidney Blumenthal & Co. v. United States, 30 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1929)
(discussing the doctrine in a case where the goods had been shipped via an unauthorized line).
76. St. Johns N. F. Shipping Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral, 263 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1923).
Accord Cunard S.S. Co., v. Buerger, [1926] A.C. 1 (H.L.) 10–11 (appeal taken from Eng.).
77. E.g., The Sarnia, 278 F. 459, 466 (2d Cir. 1921) (Mack, J., dissenting); see Steven F.
Friedell, The Deviating Ship, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1535, 1551 n.66 (1981).
78. See Friedell supra note 77, at 1556–58 (discussing Congress’s intent to allow ships to
invoke a limitation to their liability).
79. E.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 706 F.2d 80, 87–88 (2d Cir. 1983); Nemeth v.
Gen. S.S. Corp., 694 F.2d 609, 614 (9th Cir. 1982); Spartus Corp. v. S.S. Yafo, 590 F.2d 1310,
1317 (5th Cir. 1979). But see Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Poseidon Schiffahrt, 313 F.2d 872, 875 (7th
Cir. 1963).
80. Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. v. S.S. John Weyerhaeuser, 507 F.2d 68, 72, (2d Cir.
1974); see also Vision Air Flight Serv., Inc. v. M.V. Nat’l Pride, 155 F.3d 1165, 1176 nn.12, 13
(9th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases limiting the deviation doctrine and limiting the doctrine to the
intentional destruction of goods or where the actor believes that the damage is substantially
certain to occur); B.M.A. Indus., Ltd. v. Nigerian Star Line, Ltd., 786 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1986)
(not applying doctrine to allegation of criminal misdelivery).
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That is about as far as a court can go without overruling itself.81 To my
knowledge, no other country applies the deviation doctrine to deprive carriers
of their statutory right to limitation, and the more recent treaties on carriage of
goods by sea, which the United States has not adopted, limit the carrier’s right
only when it causes damage either intentionally or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result.82
CONCLUSION
Hopefully this Article gives some glimpse of the range of possibilities
open to the professor of an admiralty course. Because the materials in the
course cover so much, they are challenging, but also liberating. There is too
much for any one person to know, but one can take almost any approach one
feels like and apply it to whatever subject is of interest. Moreover, as new
problems unfold and as new legal theories arise, the admiralty professor can
always explore new vistas.

81. Perhaps the Second Circuit went a little further when it said, “[T]here are persuasive
reasons supporting the view that COGSA has abolished the harsh doctrine that cast a carrier as an
insurer after deviation and prevented it from invoking either a contractual or statutory limitation
on liability.” Sedco, Inc. v. S.S. Strathewe, 800 F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1986).
82. Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of
Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Signed at Brussels on 25th August 1924, Feb. 23, 1968, 1412
U.N.T.S 128, 130; United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978, Mar. 31,
1978, 1695 U.N.T.S 3, 8.
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